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Abstract
This study highlights the need for analysis of online disclosure practices followed by non-
governmental organizations; furthermore, it justifies the crucial role of potential correlates of
online disclosure practices followed by non-governmental organizations. We propose a
novel index for analyzing the extent of online disclosure of non-governmental organizations
(NGO). Using the information stored in an auxiliary variable, we propose a new estimator for
gauging the average value of the proposed index. Our approach relies on the use of two fac-
tors: imperfect ranked-set sampling procedure to link the auxiliary variable with the study
variable, and an NGO disclosure index under simple random sampling that uses information
only about the study variable. Relative efficiency of the proposed index is compared with the
conventional estimator for the population average under the imperfect ranked-set sampling
scheme. Mathematical conditions required for retaining the efficiency of the proposed index,
in comparison to the imperfect ranked set sampling estimator, are derived. Numerical scru-
tiny of the relative efficiency, in response to the input variables, indicates; if the variance of
the NGO disclosure index is less than the variance of the estimator under imperfect ranked
set sampling, then the proposed index is universally efficient compared to the estimator
under imperfect ranked set sampling. If the condition on variances is unmet, even then the
proposed estimator remains efficient if majority of the NGO share online data on the auxil-
iary variable. This work can facilitate nonprofit regulation in the countries where most of the
non-governmental organizations maintain their websites.
I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, substantial developments in communication and collaboration
technologies have transformed the world into a digitally interlinked space. Most organizations
use multiple digital platforms to communicate with internal and external stakeholders. How-
ever, the organizational website is often the primary source of information for external stake-
holders. Taking a historic view, Friedman [1] discussed the ten “flatteners” that have
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transformed our world: Collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, introduction of Netscape in 1995,
workflow software (e.g., ProWorkflow, Nintex, and Dapulse), uploading information on the
internet, offshoring, outsourcing, supply-chaining, insourcing, informing through search
engines (e.g., Bing, and Google), wireless communication devices (which were highlighted as
the “steroids”), and file-sharing tools [1]. Although Friedman [1] did not allude towards the
accountability practices that organizations should adhere to; a cogent argument can be
inferred that in such an interlinked world, transparent norms of sharing information will
imply better accountability trends among the organizations [1].
Kahneman [2] discussed the idea that human beings are not always rational agents. He theoret-
ically delineated the human decision-making process into two systems: System-I that takes quick
decisions in urgent scenarios, and system-II that is invoked for reflective and complex decision-
making. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) can shape public opinion by impressing upon
both systems of human cognition. NGO can selectively prioritize the mention of certain topics on
their websites; thereby, influencing the public through availability bias, i.e., the tendency of
human beings to consider available information more important than the absent information.
This backdrop mandates the need for better accountability practices among NGO. Given
that NGO are usually nonprofit organizations, their efficiency should be defined in terms of
their capacity, and ability to achieve social goals in the thematic area that they are serving [3].
While globalization has become a cliche´, the neologism “Global Administrative Law (GAL)” is
probably a more specific term [4]. GAL purports the idea of global governance. Proponents of
this notion assert that the world is one global administrative space; therefore, international reg-
ulatory institutions should monitor the economic, political, and social dynamics of individual
states. They argue for trans-governmental regulatory paradigms through international organi-
zations, respecting the interdependence of key domains of security, economic and social devel-
opment, intellectual property rights, and analysis and regulation of human inter-country
migrations. In the words of Kingsbury [5] GAL is explained as follows;
“The term ‘law’ in GAL means a ‘body of rules’, which in this case regulate international orga-
nizations, global hybrid public-private or genuinely private institutions exercising public func-
tions, states and both transnational and domestic civil societies” [5].
GAL encompasses governance and administrative issues of the entire world, interweaving
aforementioned issues at national, international, transnational, and domestic levels. GAL is a
cosmopolitan approach of governance that perceives the world as a global constituency; there-
fore, it advocates the idea of international accountability standards that organizations should
follow [6]. While the cosmopolitan school of thought is yet to arrive at a consensus in terms of
the optimum paradigms for the institutionalization of accountability mechanisms for such an
interdependent version of the world, they emphasize the need to give weight to the representa-
tions of NGO in global administrative space [6]. The ideas purported by the cosmopolitans
have not gone unheeded; examples of involvement of NGO in the world affairs are numerous,
such as NGO representation in the platform for addressing the complaints regarding projects
funded by the World Bank [6]. A more specific example is the World Bank Inspection Panel
that analyzes the provision of the most basic needs of the world; it has representation in the
Codex-Alimentarius Commission which supports food legislation of the world [6]. The com-
mitment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) towards the importance of NGO is mani-
fested in the article V.2 of the Marrakesh agreement, which states that NGO can participate
directly in the WTO negotiations for the purpose of transparency and consultative delibera-
tions [7]. The WTO Decision WT/L/162 states that the WTO agreements should be analyzed
by the WTO Secretariat in consultation with NGO to maximize transparency [8].
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Building on the idea of a global administrative space, researchers have analyzed similarities
and dissimilarities in the accountability paradigms of different countries. Nazuk [9] conducted
an inquiry into the accountability practices followed in different countries. By analyzing a
web-survey of 19 countries (from all human-inhabited continents), they checked three traits
that support the accountability paradigm of NGO; the traits were, existence of a regulatory
authority for NGO, existence of an independent NGO watchdog, and provision of a search-tab
on the website of the aforementioned regulatory authority. They concluded that the perfor-
mance of NGO from Europe and North America was the best, while the NGO from Asia and
Africa performed worst, indicating a positive correlation between income group and the three
aforementioned traits [9]. Out of 19 countries considered by Nazuk [9], the best performing
trait was the existence of an NGO regulatory body, followed by the existence of search-tab on
the website of the NGO regulatory body. The worst performance trait was the existence of an
NGO watchdog body. More specifically, 89.5% of the sampled countries had NGO regulatory
bodies, 63.2% had search-tabs on the websites of their NGO regulatory bodies, while only
31.6% had an independent NGO watchdog [9]. In the absence of either an NGO watchdog or
an NGO sector regulatory body, the importance of independent evaluation of NGO’ websites
is even more pronounced.
Many researchers have highlighted the importance of a registered website of an NGO [3,
10–12]. An NGO is mainly accountable in three forms: upward accountability, downward
accountability, and internal accountability. Downward accountability focuses on efficient flow
of information towards the NGO’s beneficiaries; internal accountability focuses on efficient
flow of information within an organization; and upward accountability focuses on meeting
information demands of donors, the host/funding government, and the government of the
country where the NGO is operating [13, 14]. With the help of its website, an NGO can share
crucial data, meeting the demands for the various aspects of accountability [15–17]. Online
dissemination of accountability related information can provide opportunities for mutual
information exchange between stakeholders, e.g., via a typical tool like a public blog on the
NGO’s website [18]. It has been previously shown that the public is interested in understand-
ing the impact of the nonprofit sector; for instance, Voitkane & Jakusonoka [19] analyzed the
voluntary disclosure of financial information on the websites of public benefit organizations in
Latvia. Despite the fact that 47% of the respondents in their survey showed interest in retriev-
ing online information through an organization’s website, only 22% of the organizations share
financial data [19]. Realizing the importance of the internet as an online tool for dissemination
of information, researchers have designed indices to monitor the quality of information shared
online by the NGO. Boire and Prakash [20] designed a 7-dimensional accountability index
that can be used to evaluate the online disclosure practices followed by the NGO working in
the USA. The aforementioned dimensions are as follows: beneficiary responsibility (4 ele-
ments), codes and standards (6 elements), employment responsibility (5 elements), environ-
mental responsibility (4 elements), financial responsibility towards donors (10 elements),
public responsibility (6 elements), and supplier responsibility (4 elements). Do, Davey & Coy
[21] analyzed the quality of information shared by organizations in South Korea, through the
Local E-government Accountability (LEGA) index. They considered three dimensions to con-
struct the LEGA index: quality of general disclosures, intensity of financial information, and
quality of the website as an online tool for accountability.
Developed countries often have more stringent legislation to circumvent information
asymmetries in the nonprofit sector. For example, the NGO in the USA, except for faith-based
nonprofits, can only claim exemption from tax, if they submit IRS form 990 to the Internal
Revenue Services (US Department of Treasury; Title 26, section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code, is applicable for NGO working in USA) [22]. Therefore, submitting the IRS form 990 to
PLOS ONE NGO disclosure; auxiliary information
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297 September 15, 2020 3 / 16
the Internal Revenue Services is a mandatory action for NGO working in USA. This ensures
that NGO share crucial information, for instance, total liabilities, total assets, information on
donations of more than $25,000─ in non-cash form, contributions of historical treasures or
similar assets, list of all current and previous employees along with data of their annual salaries,
members of the board of directors, and list of contractors. Stakeholders can obtain any NGO’s
IRS form 990 directly from the Internal Revenue Services [23] or download it from charity
watchdogs working in the USA, such as Guidestar and Pro Publica [24, 25]. Charity Services
regulates the NGO working in New Zealand; its website includes an interactive clickable map
through which the public can stay abreast of live statistics about the charities working in differ-
ent particular areas of the country, users can search for a charity by its name, street address,
and registration number [26]. All charities working in New Zealand are required to submit
annual returns data, performance report, and financial data to Charity Services. Moreover,
Charity Services conducts a holistic audit of the charities that are registered with it; the audit
process encompasses all the organizational phases, for instance, the form ISA (NZ) 265 per-
tains to analyzing the internal communication efficiency of those entrusted with governance,
and management of the charity; the form ISA (NZ) 710 pertains to comparative temporal
audit of financial statements [27].
Auxiliary information, such as total revenue and number of branches of an NGO, is linked
with their online disclosure practices. Researchers have empirically shown that larger NGO are
more likely to disclose (on their websites) rich information encompassing various dimensions
of accountability [6, 28, 29]. Having established that auxiliary information can play an impor-
tant role in explaining the information culture of NGO in the cyberspace, we took inspiration
from two groups of researchers: those who discussed estimators for population mean in the
presence of auxiliary information [30–37], and those who made use of auxiliary information in
ranked set sampling schemes [38–41].
This study highlights the importance of the organizational websites, as a tool for better
accountability. Our approach capitalizes on the observation that many NGO share data about
an auxiliary variable i.e., total revenue; therefore, incorporating the data of total revenue, a
new index is proposed to analyze the online disclosure practices of non-governmental organi-
zations. While several applications of imperfect ranked-set sampling scheme can be found in
research literature, we present a novel application of this sampling scheme for monitoring the
quality of information shared online by the non-governmental organizations.
II. Materials and methods
We propose a new estimator for analyzing the online disclosure practices of non-governmental
organizations; the proposed index makes use of the information stored in an auxiliary variable.
For online disclosure scores, we follow the NGO disclosure index constructed by Nazuk &
Shabbir [16], which comprises three dimensions of online accountability: usability, content,
and communication. From here on we shall refer to the index proposed by Nazuk & Shabbir
[16] as NDI. The first dimension of NDI is the website’s usability, implying that the website
content should be user-friendly and purposefully clear, for instance, a clickable link that routes
to specific sections of websites, such as a clickable link labeled, “International Linkages”.
Nazuk & Shabbir [16] defined 11 elements of usability: home page length, click ability, external
links to international organizations, external links to local organizations, search tab, availabil-
ity of website in more than one languages, site map, and the four WCAG2 [42] criteria i.e., per-
ceivability, understandability, operability, and robustness.
“Good usability is when we use something almost or completely without noticing that we are
using an interface to do the thing we want to do (e.g., boxes of fruit juice with those nice plastic
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lids). If we do notice the interface, it might be to register the pleasure of using that interface. Poor
usability is when we get frustrated and the method/interface seems to be a barrier, stopping us
from making progress (e.g., a friend gives you a lift in to get out, almost always a problem to do
quickly and effectively)” [43].
The second dimension of NDI is the (website) content. Effective website content ensures
that stakeholders who visit the website are actively engaged; therefore, NGO should ensure
that the website has no irrelevant content and is regularly updated. If the website content is not
efficiently curated, then there is an exponential decrease in the probability of a visitor using
the website [44]. Nazuk & Shabbir [16] included 32 elements of content: information about
the website developer(s), information about copyrights, address of NGO’s nationwide office,
mission statement, NGO’s strategic plan and goals, NGO’s background information, an active
link for donations, information about past projects spearheaded by the NGO, list of programs,
information about opportunities for volunteering, data about jobs and online jobs’ portal,
office location shown on a geographic information system, FAQs (frequently asked questions),
calendar of events, use of media to apprise the users about the NGO, measures used to evaluate
its performance, audited financial statements, annual reports, privacy policy, members of
BOD (board of directors), minutes of BOD meeting(s), contact directory listing the employees,
method to apply for membership/services/programs, community updates, newsletter(s), pro-
cedure for submitting feedback, NGO’s registration number, statistical proofs of performance,
NGO bylaws, information about the law under which it is registered, information about certifi-
cation & awards, physical addresses of branches operating in Pakistan.
The third dimension of NDI is the website’s quality of communication, which has three ele-
ments: link to social networking sites, a blog, and profiling of surveys conducted for employees
and beneficiaries.
Each element can be given a score from 0 to 3, depending upon the quality of disclosures,
for instance, for the dimension of “content”, if no annual report is shared, then a zero score is
awarded to the element “annual reports”; if only the latest annual report is shared (while the
age of NGO is greater than one), then the score is 1.5; and if full archives of annual reports is
available, then the score is 3.
This study offers significant improvement in the index proposed by Nazuk & Shabbir [16]
by incorporating vital information from the NGO website. An additional advantage of the pro-
posed methodology is the use of ranked set sampling that has better performance than the sim-
ple random sampling [38–41]; Nazuk & Shabbir [16] used simple random sampling. Suppose
that [(100)(ϖ)]% NGO share online information on all the elements of the three dimensions of
NDI, while [(100)(1−ϖ)]% NGO share information on these dimensions and total revenue,
then we propose the following estimator for the mean score of online disclosure index for
NGO; from hereon we shall refer it as NDIA (NGO Disclosure Index under Auxiliary Infor-
mation; mathematically expressed as m^NGO:Disclosures). It has been observed that some NGO share
auxiliary information on their websites; such information may include total revenue. Imperfect
ranked set sampling is used as we can rank the NGO according to the auxiliary information;
literature indicates that imperfect ranked set sampling is more efficient than the simple ran-
dom sampling [38–41]. By doing so, we are ranking the NGO with minimal calculations; we
only need to note that value of the auxiliary variable.
m^NGO:Disclosures ¼ $m^NDI þ ð1   $Þm^IRSS; ð1Þ
where
½m^NDI ¼ w1m^Usabilty þ w2m^Content
þð1   w1   w2Þm^Communication�
; ð2Þ
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Nazuk and Shabbir [16] derived the optimum values of w1 and w2, the optimum values are
given in Eq (3).
W1 ¼
1
1þ
VðXUÞ½VðXCÞ þ VðXComÞ�
VðXCÞVðXComÞ
;
VðXkÞ ¼ pkqk; Xk � BinomialðpkÞ; k ¼ U;C;Com;
W2 ¼
1
1þ
VðXCÞ½VðXUÞ þ VðXComÞ�
VðXUÞVðXComÞ
:
#
ð3Þ
Numerical values of these weights are dependent upon the probabilities of NGO meeting
the threshold values of usability, content, and communication; these thresholds can be taken
from a study conducted in a similar environment. For instance, Denmark and Finland follow
restrictive regulatory style of NGO regulation, macro-institutions follow corporatism; there-
fore, if a study conducted in Finland finds that the usability score for NGO’ websites is 15, then
we can use pU = (Usabilty Score�15), for Denmark, so, if 30% of the NGO in Denmark score
at least 15 on usability then pU = 0.3 [22]. Another approach proposed by Nazuk [9], is to use
sample average of score on each dimension as an estimate of the thresholds i.e., if the average
score of usability is 2, then we can use it as an estimate of the threshold for usability. The opti-
mum variance of m^NDI is given by the equation;
Vðm^NDIÞopt ¼
1
1þ
VðXUÞ½VðXCÞ þ VðXComÞ�
VðXCÞVðXComÞ
8
><
>:
9
>=
>;
2
VðXUÞþ
þ
1
1þ
VðXCÞ½VðXUÞ þ VðXComÞ�
VðXUÞVðXComÞ
8
><
>:
9
>=
>;
2
VðXCÞ þ ::::
::::þ 1  
1
1þ
VðXU Þ½VðXCÞþVðXComÞ�
VðXCÞVðXComÞ
( )
 
1
1þ
VðXCÞ½VðXU ÞþVðXComÞ�
VðXU ÞVðXComÞ
( )" #2
VðXComÞ� ð4Þ
Having discussed the procedure for calculation of m^NDI, we now proceed to the procedure
for computing m^IRSS i.e., the estimated average online disclosure score derived through the
imperfect ranked set sampling scheme; using total revenue as the auxiliary variable. To calcu-
late m^IRSS we propose the procedure explained below;
1. (a) Draw a random sample of m NGO; rank these NGO in accordance of their total reve-
nues. (b) For the NGO with minimum value of total revenue, calculate the value of NDI by
using Eqs (2) and (3).
2. Repeat (1) (a), for the NGO with the second minimum value of total revenue calculate the
value of NDI by using Eqs (2) and (3).
3. Repeat step (1) and (2) r times to complete r cycles of the imperfect ranked set sampling
scheme. This procedure generates a sample of size n, where n = mr.
4. Let Xi(i:m)[j] represents the value of NDI on the ith measured NGO with rank j i.e., NGO
with jth smallest value of total revenue, j = 1,2,. . ..r, and r represents the cycle number. An
illustration of the 1st cycle of this procedure is given in Table 1.
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The variance expression for m^IRSS is given below.
Vðm^IRSSÞ ¼ V
1
mr
Xm
i¼1
:
Xr
j¼1
Yiði:mÞ½j��
 !
¼
1
ðmrÞ2
Xr
j¼1
:
Xm
i¼1
V mY þ
rXYsY
sX
ðXiði:mÞ½j�   mXÞ þ εij
� �
Vðm^IRSSÞ ¼
1
m2r
Xm
i¼1
VXEY=X mY þ
rXYsY
sX
ðXiði:mÞ½j�   mXÞ þ εij
� �� �
þ
1
m2r
Xm
i¼1
EXVY=X mY þ
rXYsY
sX
ðXiði:mÞ½j�   mXÞ þ εij
� �� �
where εij represents the random error induced due to the imperfect ranking scheme used to rank the NGOs:
#
ð5Þ
Vðm^IRSSÞ ¼
s2Yð1   r
2
XYÞ
mr
þ
r2XYs
2
Y
s2X
1
m2r
Xm
i¼1
s2Xði:mÞ; ð6Þ
where s2Y is variance of Y i.e., variation in the values of NDI, s
2
X is the variation in the values of
X i.e., variation in the values of total revenue of NGO, r2XY is the correlation between Y and X.
We obtain the variance expression for m^NGO:Disclosures is given below;
Vðm^NGO:DisclosuresÞ ¼ $
2Vðm^NDIÞ þ ð1   $Þ
2Vðm^IRSSÞ: ð7Þ
To analyze the performance of m^NGO:Disclosures we compare it with m^IRSS, so that we can com-
ment whether the availability of data for total revenue, for [100�(1−ϖ)]% NGO improves the
quality of estimation of the average NGO disclosure score in the population.
III. Calculations
The mathematical condition for better performance of m^NGO:Disclosures as compared to m^IRSS; is
given below.
$2Vðm^NDIÞ þ ð1   $Þ
2Vðm^IRSSÞ < Vðm^IRSSÞ
$2Vðm^NDIÞ < Vðm^IRSSÞð1   1   $2 þ 2$Þ
$2Vðm^NDIÞ < Vðm^IRSSÞð2$   $2Þ
Vðm^NDIÞ < Vðm^IRSSÞ
2$   $2
$2
� �
Vðm^NDIÞ < Vðm^IRSSÞ
2
$
  1
� �
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1 <
2
$
#
ð8Þ
Table 1. Sample layout of 1st cycle of imperfect ranked set sampling procedure.
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set m
X1(1:m)[1] X1(2:m)[1] X1(3:m)[1] X1(m:7)[1]
X2(1:m)[1] X2(2:m)[1] X3(2:m)[1] Xm(m:m)[1]
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Xm(1:m)[1] Xm(2:m)[1] X3(m:7)[1] Xm(m)[1]
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297.t001
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$ <
2
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1
#
ð9Þ
Note that if the denominator is less than 2, only then the condition on the weight is univer-
sally true; therefore, we reduce the above equation to the following form.
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1 < 2
Vðm^NDIÞ < Vðm^IRSSÞ
#
ð10Þ
The denominator of the term on the left-hand side of inequality (9), can be greater than 2;
even then, the inequality may hold in some cases. For one such case, consider the equations
that follow.
Vðm^IRSSÞ ¼ 0:0036; Vðm^NDIÞ ¼ 0:0833; then
2
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1
< 0:083 or $ < 0:083:
For the cases when the denominator is greater than 2, an analysis of the asymptotic behav-
ior of the term on the right-hand side in inequality (9), leads to
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1 > 2
Vðm^NDIÞ > Vðm^IRSSÞ
#
ð11Þ
It must be noted that the inequality (11) is met only in some limiting cases; if the denomina-
tor is 4, then ϖ must be less than 0.5 to make the proposed estimator efficient. Note that the
more the denominator is greater than 2, the more stringent the condition on ϖ is; for instance,
if the denominator is 40, then ϖ must be less than 0.05 to make the proposed estimator effi-
cient. Note that use of a small value of ϖ is possible if the majority of the NGO share auxiliary
information because Eq (1) requires that (1−ϖ)% share data on auxiliary variable i.e., total
revenue.
IV. Numerical comparison of the proposed estimator with the
estimator under imperfect ranked set sampling
For the purpose of numerically observing the behavior of relative efficiency, we are reporting
the cases when pU = pC = pCom = 0.5, so, the optimal weights are given as follows, w1 = w2 =
w3 = 0.3333; where sum of weights is 1. Note that pU is the probability that an NGO’s usability
score exceeds the threshold set for the usability dimension of the index proposed by Nazuk
and Shabbir [16] i.e., m^NDI, similarly, pC is the probability of exceeding the corresponding
threshold for the dimension of content, while PCom is the probability of exceeding the corre-
sponding threshold for the dimension of communication. The reason we have analyzed the
relative efficiency of the proposed index for pU = pC = pCom = 0.5, is the fact that variance of
m^NDI is an increasing function of pU, pC, and PCom, until 0.5, after which the variance starts
decreasing. Therefore, we have considered the case when the variation in m^NDI is highest; this
setting reflects the scenario when the NGO’ online disclosure practices are not strictly regu-
lated, therefore, different NGO m^NDI scores vary significantly. For the countries where the non-
profit sector is highly regulated, values of pU, pC, and PCom>0.5 can be used to compute the
optimal weights w1, w2, and w3.
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In Table 2, one can observe that, other things remaining constant, as ϖ increases from 0.1
to 0.8, an approximate increase in the relative efficiency of m^NGO:Disclosures from 123 to 2500 takes
place. When variation in online disclosures of NGO is higher, the improvement in relative effi-
ciency is more significant. This means when the disclosure practices are not strictly regulated,
then NGO follow organizational culture more than external pressures for sharing information,
as a result there is significant variation in the online disclosure scores. Irrespective of the pat-
tern in Table 2, it is readily evident that m^NGO:Disclosures performs much better than m^IRSS; we have
tested the response to very low values of σY, or (and) σX, even in such scenarios m^NGO:Disclosures
performs much better than m^IRSS. In Table 3, we can observe that at ϖ = 0.8, an increase in r2XY
decreases the relative efficiency of the proposed estimator, nevertheless, the proposed estima-
tor still remains efficient. A practical interpretation of Table 3 is that when r2XY is high, then we
must assign more weight to m^IRSS in Eq (1) because the auxiliary variable is strongly correlated
with the study variable; therefore, it is logical to take maximum advantage of it. To better
understand this, note the last row of Table 3, r2XY is high but we keep on assigning more weight
to m^NDI by using ϖ = 0.8, then we are not making the best use of the auxiliary variable, this has
caused the relative efficiency to decrease as compared to the earlier rows in Table 3; despite
this, the proposed estimator remains efficient than m^IRSS.
Table 2. Relative efficiency of μ^NGO:Disclosures in comparison to μ^IRSS; impact of increase in σY, and ϖ.
σY σX ρ2XY m R X
m
i¼1
σ2Xði:mÞ
ϖ R.E
10 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.1 123.45
10 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.5 398.66
10 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.8 2372.84
100 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.1 123.46
100 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.5 399.99
100 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.8 2498.66
1000 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.1 123.46
1000 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.5 400.00
1000 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.8 2499.99
10000 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.1 123.46
10000 10 0.1 2 2 100.00 0.5 400.00
10000 10 0.1 2 2 100.00 0.8 2500.00
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297.t002
Table 3. Relative efficiency of μ^NGO:Disclosures in comparison to μ^IRSS; impact of increase in ρ
2
XY and ϖ.
σY σX ρ2XY m r X
m
i¼1
σ2Xði:mÞ
ϖ R.E
10 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.8 2372.84
10 10 0.2 2 2 100 0.8 2370.99
10 10 0.3 2 2 100 0.8 2367.79
10 10 0.4 2 2 100 0.8 2363.04
10 10 0.5 2 2 100 0.8 2356.40
10 10 0.6 2 2 100 0.8 2347.36
10 10 0.7 2 2 100 0.8 2335.08
10 10 0.8 2 2 100 0.8 2318.21
10 10 0.9 2 2 100 0.8 2294.38
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297.t003
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In Table 4, to analyze the performance of m^NGO:Disclosures with an increase in the value of r
2
XY ,
we simulated the values of relative efficiency for r2XY between [0.1, 0.8]; for ϖ = 0.1, the value of
relative efficiency is 123, approximately. For ϖ = 0.5, the value of relative efficiency is 400,
approximately; while for ϖ>0.5, the value of relative efficiency is inversely proportional to r2XY ,
for instance, at ϖ = 0.8, as r2XY increases the relative efficiency of m^NGO:Disclosures decreases, because
if there is a higher correlation between online disclosures and total revenue we should weigh
m^IRSS in Eq (1) but keeping ϖ = 0.8 means we are giving 80% weight to m^NDI: In Table 4, one can
observe that when an increase in variation in total revenue i.e., σX, is accompanied by an
increase in ϖ, then the relative efficiency starts improving significantly. This means if there are
NGO with diverse values of total revenue then we should rely more on m^NDI; this means that in
the presence of a heterogeneous sample, there is a need to introduce a stratified version of
m^NGO:Disclosures. However, one must observe that even the simple randomly sampled version of Eq
(1), retains the efficiency of m^NGO:Disclosures; in simple words even if one does not choose ϖ cau-
tiously, performance of m^NGO:Disclosures, remains better than m^IRSS. In Tables 5 and 6, one can
Table 4. Relative efficiency of μ^NGO:Disclosures in comparison to μ^IRSS; impact of increase in Var(X) and ϖ.
σY σX ρ2XY m r X
m
i¼1
σ2Xði:mÞ
ϖ R.E
10 10 0.1 2 2 100 0.1 123.45
10 100 0.1 2 2 100 0.5 398.66
10 500 0.1 2 2 100 0.8 2372.23
10 1000 0.1 2 2 100 0.9 7857.47
10 10 0.5 2 2 100 0.1 123.45
10 100 0.5 2 2 100 0.5 398.23
10 500 0.5 2 2 100 0.8 2334.07
10 1000 0.5 2 2 100 0.9 7353.36
10 10 0.8 2 2 100 0.1 123.45
10 100 0.8 2 2 100 0.5 396.36
10 500 0.8 2 2 100 0.8 2177.57
10 1000 0.8 2 2 100 0.9 5714.98
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297.t004
Table 5. Relative efficiency of μ^NGO:Disclosures in comparison to μ^IRSS; impact of increase in m.
σY σX ρ2XY m r X
m
i¼1
σ2Xði:mÞ
ϖ R.E
10 100 0.1 2 5 1000 0.1 123.44
10 100 0.1 5 2 1000 0.1 123.44
10 100 0.1 10 2 1000 0.1 123.43
10 100 0.1 20 2 1000 0.1 123.41
10 100 0.1 50 2 1000 0.1 123.33
10 100 0.1 100 2 1000 0.1 123.20
10 100 0.1 150 2 1000 0.1 123.07
10 100 0.1 200 2 1000 0.1 122.95
10 100 0.1 300 2 1000 0.1 122.69
10 100 0.1 500 2 1000 0.1 122.19
10 100 0.1 1000 2 1000 0.1 120.94
10 100 0.1 11000 2 1000 0.1 100.49
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297.t005
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observe that an increase in m results in a loss in the relative efficiency of the proposed estima-
tor; however, very large value of m is required to render the proposed estimator as inefficient.
V. Guidelines to calculate the proposed index
To influence the policymakers and stakeholders, any statistical methodology must be easy to
understand; therefore, we have summarized the proposed methodology in a concise manner.
The following steps may be followed to adopt the proposed methodology.
1. Observe the percentage of NGO that: share auxiliary information on their websites versus
those that do not share such information.
2. For those who do not share the auxiliary information, calculate NDI.
3. Those who share the information, randomly select m NGO, arrange these in ascending
order of the auxiliary information, then choose the NGO with the minimum value of auxil-
iary information, and calculate it’s NDI.
4. Randomly select another set of "m" NGO, arrange these in ascending order of the auxiliary
information, then choose the NGO with second minimum value of auxiliary information,
and calculate its NDI. Similarly, select third minimum in the third set, fourth minimum in
the fourth set, and so on up to the mth set.
5. This completes one cycle of the imperfect ranked set sampling procedure.
6. Repeat step (3) to (4) "r" times to generate NDI values for "mr" NGO. Calculate the average
score of disclosure scores through NDI in the set of "mr" NGO.
7. In the set of "mr" NGO, calculate: s2Y i.e., variance of online disclosure scores, r
2
XY i.e., corre-
lation between the online disclosure scores and the auxiliary information, s2X i.e., variance
of auxiliary information, and s2Xði:mÞ i.e. variance of the i
th minimum value of the auxiliary
variable, for instance, we can easily calculate the variance of r values corresponding to the
1st minimum value of the auxiliary variable.
8. Use Eq (6) to calculate Vðm^IRSSÞ.
Table 6. Relative efficiency of μ^NGO:Disclosures in comparison to μ^IRSS; impact of increase in m, for larger variation in the study variable, and the auxiliary variable.
σY σX ρ2XY M r X
m
i¼1
σ2Xði:mÞ
ϖ R.E
2000 1000 0.5 2 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 5 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 10 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 20 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 50 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 100 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 150 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 200 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 300 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 500 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 1000 2 10000 0.1 123.46
2000 1000 0.5 340000000 2 10000 0.1 100.11
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238297.t006
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9. Decide the thresholds for usability, content, and communication; if no such help is available
through similar studies then use sample average, for instance, if the 32 indicators of content
generate such values that their average is 2.5 then pU ¼
0; if NGO score � 2:5
1; if NGO score > 2:5
" #
. We can
use such an average that is a fair representative of the balance point of data i.e., arithmetic
mean if the data is not markedly skewed, or median in the case of markedly skewed distri-
bution of NDI scores. Similarly, calculate pC, and pCOM, then use Eq (3) to calculate opti-
mum weights required for computation of NDI. Using the values of these probabilities, and
weights, calculate variance of NDI through Eq (4).
10. Compare Vðm^IRSSÞ with Vðm^NDIÞ.
11. Calculate
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1, if it is less than 2, then we can safely use any value of ϖ. If
Vðm^NDIÞ
Vðm^IRSSÞ
þ 1 > 2, then look for a suitable value of ϖ required to render NDIA or
m^NGO:Disclosures, efficient, if there is a plausible value then compute NDIA or m^NGO:Disclosures, oth-
erwise rely only on NDI by taking ϖ = 1.
VI. Discussion and conclusions
This paper discussed the potential of an index to monitor the online disclosure practices of
non-governmental organizations (NGO), with a view to enable the stakeholders of the non-
profit sector to analyze different dimensions of accountability. Our approach offers a new
methodology of monitoring accountability through the information shared on the NGO web-
sites. Application of the proposed index i.e., NGO Disclosure Index under Auxiliary Informa-
tion (NDIA), is possible with basic knowledge of mathematics; nevertheless, NGO (or the
relevant regulatory body) can request support from a quantitative expert to calculate the value
of NDIA. Significance of this study roots from the fact that there is qualified documented evi-
dence of theoretical statisticians exploring the potential of complex sampling schemes to offer
accountability related solutions to the nonprofit sector; moreover, a relatively simple guide for
following the proposed methodology is showcased. Furthermore, technology can be used to
facilitate application, e.g., an app can be built to help calculate scores. Similarly, automated
measures for implementing our approach at a large (big data) scale can also be considered,
e.g., AI (Artificial Intelligence) and NLP (Natural Language Processing) tools could be created
to automatically analyze and score websites [45–47].
The post-Cold War era has witnessed a global inclination towards judicious use of authority
by the governments. Several international and transnational regulatory organizations have
emerged to control the global administrative space, such as the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, The International Association of Insurance Fraud Agencies, United Nations,
World Trade Organizations, The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Cus-
toms-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, The Open Group, and World Customs Organiza-
tion. Existence of so many regulatory organizations is sometimes debated as suboptimal,
primarily because of the occasionally reported high profile negative events involving these
organizations; nevertheless, one cannot label all these efforts as futile. Meaningful contribu-
tions from independent researchers are required to offer solutions for accountability para-
digms that can facilitate the administration of the ambitious frameworks like GAL. In this
context, the case of a global model of NGO regulation is even more intricate, because NGO
regulatory frameworks are diverse even at a national level; a global model of NGO accountabil-
ity requires an objective method through which stakeholders can evaluate the transparency of
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NGO. Although physical scrutiny (like audits and onsite inspections) of NGO across the world
is a vital (albeit resource heavy) task; disclosure analysis of NGO websites can be a less
demanding (yet highly effective) complementary pursuit. This study focuses on the impor-
tance of cyberspace; NGO disseminating information that may benefit various stakeholders in
the hierarchy, for example, downward accountability towards the beneficiaries, and upward
accountability towards regulatory bodies and relevant governmental departments. Although
the proposed disclosure index is designed to analyze the quality of information shared online
by the NGO, it can be used as a parallel form of accountability to conjoin or compare the infor-
mation shared through different mediums i.e., online and offline. Moreover, it can help regula-
tory bodies create public information portals providing key information about NGO
(including NDIA scores) in an accessible and transparent manner. National NDIA scores can
be calculated for NGO working in different countries; the nonprofit sector in different coun-
tries can be ranked according to the quality of online disclosures. Similarly, a conglomeration
of NGO can be defined according to different criteria, such as location of head office, thematic
service areas, and years of work. NDIA can be calculated in each conglomerate, this can facili-
tate (even enable) informed policy actions, for instance, training the officials of a conglomerate
with suboptimal performance about online disclosures.
The developed world has taken dedicated efforts to regulate the NGO sector through non-
profit accountability clubs and regulatory bodies, such as Global Reporting Initiatives, Charity
Commission, GuideStar, Charity Review Council, GiveWell, Canada Revenue Agency, The
Charity Commission of Northern Ireland, the Japan Association of Charitable Organizations,
The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission, and Change Path. Although the
developed world has taken considerable steps in the domain of the nonprofit sector’s regula-
tion, episodes of suboptimal activities are still reported, such as the case of Greenpeace that
faced public outrage due to the Brent Spar scandal in 1995 [48], or the case of a senior director
in a Japanese NGO, who forged records and falsely declared stoneware, as priceless antiques
[49]. In 2015, four charities that claimed to work for cancer patients faced charges of corrup-
tion; Federal Trade Commission of USA labeled Cancer Fund of America (CFA), Cancer Sup-
port Services (CSS), Children’s Cancer Fund of America (CCFOA), and The Breast Cancer
Society (BCS) as duplicitous entities [50]. The developing and under-developed countries are
increasingly becoming aware of the important task of NGO regulation; however, an arduous
level of effort is required to regulate the nonprofit sector in such countries. For example, con-
sider the case of Burundi, where NGO can only get registered by physically visiting Bujumbura
(the capital city of Burundi), cost of registration is very high, and many documents required
for registration are only available in hard copy from the Ministry of Home Affairs [51]. Even
in some upper-middle-income countries [52], regulations of NGO require improvements, for
instance, in the Republic of Columbia, the Public Registries of Chambers of Commerce is the
core regulatory body responsible for registration of all types of nonprofit organizations; the
exact number of NGO working in the country is not documented; moreover, the website of
the Chambers of Commerce lacks a direct link to any nonprofit accountability club working in
Columbia [53].
The vision of the world as a cosmopolitan community cannot be actualized without design-
ing uniform standards of accountability; dedicated efforts are required for all sectors, including
the global nonprofit sector. Attaining this level of efficient regulatory frameworks seems chal-
lenging, especially when the watchdogs are also doubted by the public; Blitt [54] presented the
case for the need of efficient regulatory frameworks that can work without government inter-
vention. This study is an effort to provide a statistically efficient, and pragmatic online solution
to monitor the nonprofit sector; it showcases a low-cost solution for accountability, based on
website analyses. Mathematical evaluation of the proposed index shows its ability to supersede
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simple estimators under imperfect ranked set sampling scheme. The idea purported by the
current study relies on the segregation of indicators clubbed in the NDI, while the indicators
are comprehensive; nevertheless, future researchers can add innovative details to improve the
website analytics of NGO. Researchers can embed information technology with the proposed
methodology, for instance, tools could be built for automated calculation of the online disclo-
sure index scores. Similarly, AI and NLP tools could be created for proactive monitoring (and
hence regulation) of NGO through semi or fully automated analysis of their website content
[55, 56].
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